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Abstract
CubeSats are small satellites used for scientific experiments because they cost less than full sized
satellites. Each CubeSat uses an on-board computer. The on-board computer performs sensor
measurements, data processing, and CubeSat control. The challenges of designing an on-board
computer are costs, radiation, thermal stresses, and vibrations. An on-board computer was designed
and implemented to solve these challenges. The on-board computer used special components to
mitigate radiation effects. Software was also used to provide redundancies in cases of faults. This
paper may aid future spacecraft design as it improves the reliability of spacecraft, while keeping
costs low.
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CubeSats are just scaled down versions of full-sized satellites. CubeSats are used for smallpayloads such as scientific experiments in space, Earth observations, and low rate telecommu-nications. For example, AALTO-1 CubeSat (Praks et al., 2015) surveys mineral deposits and
farmlands using an Earth observation camera. The camera allows miners to find new mining sites.
Moreover, farmers can calculate the yields of their farms using the images. GeneSat-1 CubeSat
(Kitts et al., 2007) is an example of a CubeSat running biological experiments in space. GeneSat-1
studies the effects of micro-gravity on E. coli bacteria. Furthermore, BRICSat-P CubeSat (Hurley
et al., 2016) has an experimental thruster design. BRICSat-P tests an electric propulsion system for
future rocket designs.
The International Space Station launches most of the CubeSats into low Earth orbit (LEO).
These CubeSats orbit around 350 km to 800 km above Earth. A 10cm× 10cm× 10cm CubeSat costs
around $30,000 USD (Heidt, Puig-Suari, Moore, Nakasuka, & Twiggs, 2000) to build and $100,000
USD to launch. On the other hand, a 100kg full-sized satellite costs $100 million USD (Bearden,
2001) to build and to launch. Costs for constructing and launching CubeSats are significantly lower
than for full-sized satellites. Therefore, CubeSats are low-cost alternatives to full-sized satellites. In
conclusion, these low-cost CubeSats have been adopted by many universities across the world as an
exploration tool.
The CubeSat’s primary objective is the payload execution. Most payloads contain scientific
experiments or sensor equipment. The CubeSat uses the on-board computer (OBC) to execute
the payload and to retrieve sensor data. Moreover, the OBC has a microcontroller (MCU) and a
memory storage. The MCU processes data, while the memory store stores the sensor data and the
program data. After processing the data, the data is sent to Earth using amateur radio. Space-
grade components such as the $950 VA10820 (Mouser_VA10820, 2018), $2900 MSP430FR5969-SP
(Mouser_MSP430FR5969, 2018), $4000 5962H9853702VXC-CTEST (Arrow_5962H9853702VXC-
CTEST, 2018), and $5100 HXNV01600AEN (Arrow_HXNV01600AEN, 2018) are very expensive.
As CubeSat projects have low budgets of $30,000, CubeSat designers cannot afford to use space
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grade components. As a result, CubeSat designers use commercial off the shelf (COTS) components
as COTS components are far cheaper. However, COTS components are less robust when compared
to space grade components. COTS components have lower tolerance to radiation, vibrations, and
thermal stresses. This lower tolerance limits the CubeSat’s lifespan to two years in LEO. Radiation
poses a large risk to the OBC as memory regions of the OBC could get corrupted. Moreover,
radiation could cause permanent damage to the OBC’s integrated circuits (ICs). Permanent damage
results in an unrecoverable failure.
This paper is organized into a literature review, design overview and requirements, implemented
designs, and conclusion. The literature review gives detailed background information about the
space environment and it compares this paper to other research papers. Design overview and
requirements gives an outline of the implemented designs. The paragraph above states the problems
of the COTS components. Solutions of these problems are found in the implemented design sections
of this paper. The design implementations use special COTS components in conjunction with robust
software designs. These special COTS components have a high tolerance to radiation, temperature,
vibrations, and noise. Furthermore, these special COTS components meet the design requirements
while keeping the costs low. In addition to the hardware solutions, software designs also mitigate the
problems caused by radiation. In conclusion, this paper will assist CubeSat designers in advancing
space exploration and scientific experiments.
Literature Review
This literature review shows the relevant background information about the space environment.
Total Ionizing Dose (TID), Single Event Upsets (SEUs), Single Event Latch-ups (SELs), and Single
Event Gate Ruptures (SEGRs) measure the impact of radiation on ICs. Firstly, TID measures the
total amount of dose an IC could receive before an unrecoverable failure. TID quantifies the lifetime
of an IC in space. Secondly, SEUs measure the number of corrupted bits and computations caused
by radiation. However, SEUs do not have any long-term effects as cold reboots resolve SEUs. On
the other hand, SELs could have long-term effects. SELs cause high current states, which may
cause permanent burnouts in IC. Lastly, SEGRs cause parts of an IC to rupture. SEGRs guarantee
permanent loss of functionality in an IC.
Other CubeSat designers have tackled the radiation problem using hardware solutions. Shields-1
CubeSat (Thomsen, Kim, & Cutler, 2015) uses special shielding to protect the COTS components
against radiation. Shields-1 uses Z-grade Al/Ta which has 30% higher shielding effectiveness
over standard Al. Austin et al.’s article (2017) shows radiation mitigation techniques for COTS
components. Their article recommends measuring TIDs and SEUs of COTS components. This
allows CubeSat designers to choose the best COTS components. Austin et al. also recommend the
usage of ferromagnetic random access memory (FRAM) and watchdog timers. These components
increase the reliability of the CubeSats. Unlike Austin et al., this paper uses software solutions in
addition to hardware solutions. The software solutions in this paper increase the reliability of the
CubeSats as software provides a cost-effective way of mitigating radiation effects.
Design Overview and Requirements
The OBC is the brains of the CubeSat because the OBC controls all of the CubeSat’s functions.
Figure 1 shows the implemented OBC’s printed circuit board (PCB). The OBC’s PCB has a
budget requirement of $2000 USD. The MCU is the TMS570LC4357. The memory storage is the
MR4A16BCMA35. TMS570 uses MR4A16BCMA35 for external memory storage. Moreover, the
system bus provides power and signal lines to the OBC. As a result of the system bus, TMS570 is
1
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Figure 1: The implemented OBC’s printed circuit board (PCB).
able to control other systems. For example, Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS)
has GPS, magnetometers, gyroscopes, sun sensors, and Earth horizon sensors. ADCS determines
the position and orientation of the CubeSat using the sensors. ADCS also adjusts the orientation of
the CubeSat using magnetic solenoids and reaction wheels. Furthermore, OBC has a TMS320C5535
digital signal processor. TMS320C5535 processes the low rate telecommunications on the CubeSat.
Telecommunications allow the ground station to communicate with the TMS570. Two TPL5010-Q1
external watchdog timers are placed on the OBC. Watchdog timers reset the OBC in an event of a
failure. These low-cost COTS components are the solutions to the design requirements problem.
Unlike other COTS components, these components have high radiation tolerances and they operate
across large temperature ranges. Moreover, they are space flight proven. In conclusion, these COTS
components cost less while ensuring the CubeSat survives the space environment.
Aside from the hardware descriptions, there are functional requirements. Telemetry, payload
control, power control, data handling, timekeeping, and memory integrity are examples of the OBC’s
functional requirements. Telemetry is the act of collecting remote sensor data. As a payload is used
on all CubeSat missions, payload control ensures the payload is executing properly. Power control
ensures brown-outs do not happen. Data handling involves sensor processing, telecommunications,
and system monitoring. Memory integrity protects the memory from data corruption.
Type of radiation Dose rate (MeV cm2g )
Heavy ion 4.75× 102
Proton 9.62× 102
Electron 1.359× 103
Total 2.796× 103
Table 1: Dose rates for solar maximum at 8× 105 m LEO (Hussmann, 2016).
2
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Hardware requirements were made for LEO as they ensure the OBC’s survivability. Table
1 shows the dose rates of a CubeSat at 8× 105 m LEO with 2× 10−3 m Al shielding. Table
1 assumes a mission duration of 6.307× 107 s (2 years). At the end of the mission, the total
received dose of a 1cm× 1cm component is 2.825× 103 rad (Si) as shown in Eqn. (1). Therefore,
components must survive TIDs of 2.825× 103 rad (Si). Moreover, components are susceptible to
SEUs. Components must also withstand a few SEUs per hour. DIETR (CSDC_Thermal, 2014)
specifies a thermal-vacuum requirement. OBC must withstand a vacuum of 5× 10−4 Torr. OBC
must also have an out-gassing requirement (NASA, 2017). This confines out-gassing to 1% of the
total mass. In addition, OBC must withstand thermal cycles from −20◦C to 70◦C. DIETR also
specifies a Launch Environment Tests requirement (CSDC_Launch, 2014). OBC must withstand a
quasi-static acceleration test of 12g. The OBC must also withstand random vibrations of 1× 10−1 g2Hz
at 2× 102 Hz. OBC’s PCB is confined to a 10 cm by 10 cm size.
For the software requirements, a real time operating system (RTOS) is needed. A RTOS schedules
tasks with high timing accuracy as the RTOS allows microsecond control of the CubeSat. Moreover,
RTOS also manages memory allocations and hardware drivers. A file system is also needed to protect
the data from radiation. The file system must have multiple copies of the file system structure.
The file system must use an error correction code (ECC) for data recovery. ECC protects data by
encoding the data. Encoded data contains multiple copies of the original data. The numerous data
copies provide redundancies in case of failures. The file system must be scrubbed within a time
interval in order to recover the corrupted data.
Implemented Memory Design
The OBC requires a reliable place to store sensor data and program data. MR4A16BCMA35
was chosen as the nonvolatile memory storage for the MCU. Each MR4A16BCMA35 stores 2MB of
data. MR4A16BCMA35 is low-cost as MR4A16BCMA35 costs around $40 USD (Digikey_MRAM,
2018). MR4A16BCMA35 is cheap when compared to other memory storages. For example,
5962H9853702VXC-CTEST costs $4000 (Arrow_5962H9853702VXC-CTEST, 2018) and
HXNV01600AEN costs $5100 (Arrow_HXNV01600AEN, 2018). MR4A16BCMA35 (Everspin, 2017)
uses magneto-resistive random access memory (MRAM) technology. In MRAM, bits are stored in
magnetic fields of the magnetic tunnel junctions. A magnetic tunnel junction has two ferromagnets
and one insulator. The insulator separates the two ferromagnets. One ferromagnet is permanent,
while the other ferro-magnet is a free layer. Orientation of the magnetic field in the free layer
determines the bit’s value. In order to write a bit, a large current is required to change the orientation
of the free layer.
Radiation in LEO consists mostly of heavy ion bombardments. As NAND memory uses charge
pumps to store bits, NAND memory is susceptible to heavy ions bombardments. Heavy ions
bombardments corrupt bits in NAND memory by changing values in the charge pumps. On the
other hand, MRAM is resistant to heavy ions bombardments as MRAM uses magnetic fields to
store bits. Heavy ions bombardments cannot generate large surges of current. Therefore, heavy
ions bombardments cannot corrupt bits in MRAM by changing the magnetic fields. As a result,
MRAM has large SEU and SEL damage thresholds. In conclusion, MRAM is resistant to radiation
as MRAM uses magnetic fields to store bits. Table 1 shows dose rates of components in LEO. The
required TID in LEO is calculated below using the dose rates in Table 1. Then MRAM’s TID is
compared to the required TID in order to prove MRAM’s survivability.
Let LEOdoserateperarea = total dose rate per area of an object in LEO as shown in Table 1
Let MRAMarea = the area of MRAM
3
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Let LEOdoserate = the dose rate of an object in 8× 105 m LEO
MRAMarea = 1cm2
LEOdoserateperarea = 2.796× 103MeV · cm
2
g · s
2.796× 103MeV · cm
2
g · s ×
1
1cm2 = 2.796× 10
3MeV
g · s
2.796× 103MeV
g · s ×
1000g
1kg ×
1.602× 10−13J
1MeV = 4.48× 10
−7 J
kg · s
LEOdoserate = 4.48× 10−7 J
kg · s ×
100rad · kg
J
LEOdoserate = 4.48× 10−5 rad
s
Let T = mission duration in seconds. 6.307× 107s (2 years).
Let LEOTID = required TID to survive in LEO for 6.307× 107s (2 years)
Let MRAMTID = MRAM’s TID as shown in Table 2
T = 6.307× 107s
LEOTID = LEOdoserate × T (1)
LEOTID = 4.48× 10−5 rad
s
× 6.307× 107s
LEOTID = 2.825× 103rad(Si)
MRAMTID = 4× 104rad(Si)
MRAMTID >> LEOTID
Parameter Limits
Data retention 20 Years
TID 4× 104 rad (Si)
SEU >1× 102MeV ·cm2mg
SEL >8.4× 101MeV ·cm2mg
Access time 3.5× 10−8 s
ECC 7 bits of parity per 64 bits
H field tolerance 8× 103 Am
Table 2: Properties of Everspin MRAM (Everspin, 2017) (Heidecker, 2013) (Zhang et al., 2018).
Table 2 shows the properties of Everspin MRAM. MRAM lasts for 20 years within a temperature
range of −40◦C to 85◦C (Everspin, 2017). Furthermore, MRAM has a TID of 4× 104 rad (Si)
(Zhang et al., 2018). MRAM’s TID of 4× 104 rad (Si) is far greater than the required TID of
2.825× 103 rad (Si) calculated in Eqn. (1). As a result of a large TID tolerance, MRAM survives the
radiation in LEO. In spite of MRAM’s TID being overkill, MRAM is the only component that has a
4
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known TID and costs less than $40 USD. Other components such as FRAM, NAND flash, and NOR
flash have unknown TIDs. On the other hand, 5962H9853702VXC-CTEST and HXNV01600AEN
have TIDs of 1× 106 rad (Si) but cost $4000 and $5100 respectively. MRAM has virtually unlimited
read/write endurance as MRAM does not wear out. MRAM’s access time of 3.5× 10−8 s matches
MCU’s SDRAM’s access time. MRAM’s SEU is greater than > 1× 102MeV ·cm2mg (Heidecker, 2013).
Therefore, MRAM tolerates SEUs. MRAM mitigates bit flips caused by SEUs as MRAM has high
SEU tolerance.
SEUs determines the bit error rate (BER) of memory. BER is important for MRAM as BER is
used to determine the total number of bits errors over a time period. Using BER from Heidecker’s
(2013) study, the total number of bit errors was calculated below for 4MB MRAM over 7.3× 102
days (2 years). Total number of bit errors shows the MRAM’s data integrity. Note: An upset is a
bit error.
Let pupset = probability of an upset per bit day
pupset = 1× 10−10 upsets
bit · day
Let p = probability of an upset for 1 bit in 7.3× 102 days
p = 1× 10−10 upsets
bit · day × 7.3× 10
2days× 1bit
p = 7.3× 10−8upsets
Calculations below show a PDF of bit errors for a 4MB MRAM with parity bits.
Let N = number of bits in memory
Let k = number of corrupted bits
Let f = binomial distribution
N = 3.55× 107bits
f =
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k (2)
5
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Figure 2: PDF of error in MRAM’s 4MB memory in 730 days.
Figure 2 shows the binomial distribution of bit errors generated from Eqn. (2). Mean bit errors
are 2 bits over 7.3× 102 days. As a result of low bit errors, MRAM fully corrects the bit errors.
This results in zero bit errors when MRAM is turned on.
However, there is a case where MRAM is turned off. During rocket launch, MRAM is powered
off for 1 day. When MRAM is turned off, MRAM cannot correct bit errors until MRAM is turned
back on. MRAM’s ECC uses 7 bits of parity for every 64 bits (Everspin, 2017). MRAM’s ECC
recovers a 1 bit error in a 71 bit block. MRAM’s ECC protects against single bit flips caused by
radiation. The calculations below show the probability of failure when MRAM is turned off for 1
day. The probability of failure determines the data’s integrity during rocket launch.
Let p = probability of an upset for 1 bit in 1 day
p = 1× 10−10 upsets
bit · day × 1day× 1bit
p = 1× 10−10upsets
Let N = number of bits per block
N = 71bits
Used Eqn. (2) to solve for the probability P71bits when k > 1.
Let P71bits = probability of ECC not correcting bit errors in 71 bits in 1 day
P71bits = f(k > 1)
P71bits = 6.66× 10−16
There are 5× 105 blocks of 71 bits for the total memory capacity (4 MB).
N = 5× 105blocks
Used Eqn. (2) to solve for the probability P4MB when k > 0.
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Let P4MB = probability of ECC not correcting bit errors in 4MB in 1 day
P4MB = f(k > 0)
P4MB = 3.33× 10−10
The probability of failure when MRAM is turned off for 1 day is P4MB = 3.33× 10−10. As
a consequence of a small probability of failure, MRAM’s ECC repairs the bit errors caused by
radiation. In conclusion, MRAM’s ECC preserves data integrity during rocket launch.
Implemented Microcontroller Design
A MCU is required to control the CubeSat. TMS570 is a MCU series (Texas Instruments,
2016). TMS570 is low-cost as TMS570 costs around $60 USD (Digikey_TMS570, 2018). TMS570 is
inexpensive when compared to other MCUs such as $950 VA10820 (Mouser_VA10820, 2018) and
$2900 MSP430FR5969-SP (Mouser_MSP430FR5969, 2018). TMS570 uses dual lockstep CPUs.
The dual lockstep CPUs are identical. Each CPU on the TMS570 independently executes the exact
same instruction. If the exact same instruction produces different results, then both CPUs will
re-execute the instruction again. Dual lockstep CPUs protect against SEUs as they prevent incorrect
computations. TMS570 also has eFuses with parity bits. In eFuses, hardwired fuses store data.
eFuses protect against radiation as radiation cannot damage fuses. TMS570 also has self testing
capabilities to detect errors in hardware. At boot-up, the TMS570 checks each built-in module. Self
testing enables the TMS570 to troubleshoot errors inflight.
TMS570 operates within a temperature range of −40◦C to 125◦C, thus satisfying the temperature
requirements. TRIUMF is a particle accelerator used for radiation testing. Radiation testing at
TRIUMF determined the TMS570’s TID of 5× 103 rad (Si). Therefore, TMS570 survives the
required TID of 2.825× 103 rad (Si). On the other hand, VA10820 and MSP430FR5969-SP have
TIDs of 3× 105 rad (Si) and 5× 104 rad (Si) respectively. VA10820 and MSP430FR5969-SP have
larger TIDs, but they cost more than the TMS570. The TMS570’s 4MB internal memory is used for
program data and the boot loader. Moreover, TMS570’s internal memory uses 64/72 bit hamming
for ECC. TMS570’s ECC corrects 1 bit for every 72 bits. During rocket launch, TMS570 is powered
off for 1 day. When TMS570 is turned off, TMS570 cannot correct bit errors until TMS570 is turned
back on. The calculations below are for the probability of bit errors when TMS570 is turned off for
1 day. The bit errors determine TMS570’s data integrity during rocket launch.
Let H = number of hours
Let p = the probability of error in a bit
Let N = number of bits
Let k = number of corrupted bits
Let f = binomial distribution
p = 1− e−H(9.0813×10−6) (3)
N = 72bits
H = 24hours
Let P72bits = probability of ECC not correcting bit errors larger than 1 bit error for 72 bits
N = 79blocks
P72bits = f(k > 1)
7
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Figure 3: PDF of error in 72 bits in 24 hours.
P72bits = 1.2× 10−4
Figure 3 shows the probability of ECC not correcting bit errors larger than 1 bit error for 72
bits. Bit error calculations used Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (3) (Hussmann, 2016). The bit error probability
is very low as P72bits = 1.2× 10−4.
The boot-loader is a critical piece of software. If radiation corrupts the boot-loader then the
entire CubeSat is useless. Therefore, the probability of error for the boot-loader is calculated below
using Eqn. (2). The boot loader uses 5000 bits or 79 blocks of TMS570’s internal memory. Each
block has 72 bits. The probability of error determines boot-loader’s survivability during rocket
launch.
Let P5000bits = probability of error in 5000 bits
P5000bits = f(k > 0)
P5000bits = 9.4× 10−3
The probability of error in the boot loader during launch is P5000bits = 9.4× 10−3. As the probability
of error is small, the boot-loader is safe from corruption during rocket launch.
Aside from the boot-loader, TMS570 also stores program data. Program data is susceptible to
radiation during rocket launch. Therefore, bit errors in the program data will be analyzed below.
Bit errors for TMS570’s 4MB memory are calculated below using Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (3). The bit
errors determine percentage of corrupted regions in the program data.
H = 24hours
p = 7.3× 10−8
8
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N = 3.6× 107bits
Figure 4: PDF of TMS570’s 4MB memory with parity in 24 hours.
Figure 4 shows the bit errors for the TM570’s 4MB memory during a 24 hour period. Standard
deviation is 55 bit errors and the mean is 7860 bit errors. Due to large bit errors in the TM570’s
4MB memory, a file system is needed to mitigate the bit errors. The file system design is found in
the software design section.
Implemented Software Design
In addition to the hardware, software also mitigates radiation. TMS570 uses FreeRTOS, a
lightweight and modular RTOS. FreeRTOS handles task scheduling, interrupt scheduling, memory
allocation, and hardware driver management. For task and interrupt scheduling, FreeRTOS allows
preemptions and static memory allocations, which increase the timing accuracy of tasks and
interrupts. FreeRTOS allows the OBC to react faster to faults and errors. Furthermore, FreeRTOS
uses a round robin scheduler to control the execution of tasks. For each task with the same priority,
the tasks receive the same CPU execution times. Along with tasks, interrupts are used to warn
the MCU of high priority tasks. For example, if the battery system is running out of energy then
an interrupt fires. After the interrupt fires, the MCU focuses solely on the interrupt and turns off
certain systems to conserve energy. As FreeRTOS manages memory allocation, FreeRTOS runs
directly on the MRAM instead of the TMS570’s internal memory. Running on the MRAM reduces
bit errors caused by radiation.
Figure 5: Bit arrangement in the modified queue system.
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Queues in FreeRTOS are used for interprocess communications between different tasks. For
example, one task sends sensor data to a buffer queue. Another task receives sensor data from the
buffer queue and processes the sensor data. Moreover, queues have built-in mutexes to eliminate race
conditions between tasks. However, the default queues in FreeRTOS are not very robust. Therefore,
the default queues will be modified. Figure 5 shows the features of the modified queue system. Each
queue element stores an 8 bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC8). CRC8 verifies the element’s data
integrity as CRC8 detects up to 8 bit errors in a element. If CRC8 detects a corrupted element, then
the element is discarded. The 8 bit message ID represents the sensor’s label. For example, sensor 1
will have a message ID of 1. Sensor 5 will have a message ID of 5. Message ID enables the receiving
task to distinguish between sensors. Messages also have time stamps associated with them. Time
stamps take up to 64 bits and are measured in seconds and microseconds. A time stamp determines
the sample time of the data.
File systems protect against data corruption as radiation corrupts data. The file system uses
Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) codes (Chien, 1964), a type of ECC. BCH codes protect the
data by encoding the data. In the file system, data is placed into blocks. BCH codes encode each
data block. Each encoded block contains parity bits. Parity bits are copies of the original data.
When an encoded block gets corrupted, BCH codes recover the original data using the parity bits in
the encoded block. As a consequence, BCH codes repair the errors caused by radiation. Thus, BCH
codes protect against radiation. Moreover, BCH codes allow designers to determine the number of
bits the BCH codes recovers. For every mt parity bits in a BCH code, the BCH code recovers up to
t bits.
The BCH code requires calculations to determine the optimal number of mt parity bits. If mt is
too small, then the file system cannot recover from bit errors. If mt is too large, then the parity bits
take up too much space. Calculations below determine the optimal number of mt parity bits for the
TMS570’s 4MB memory. Calculations assume the file system has 4095 bit blocks with a scrubbing
period of 6 hours.
Let N = number of bits in a block
Let H = scrubbing period in hours
Let m = minimal polynomial over the field GF (qm)
Let p = probability of a bit flip
Let f = binomial distribution
Let t = number of recoverable bit errors in a block
Let R = number of parity bits in the block
m = 12
N = 2m − 1
N = 212 − 1 = 4095
H = 6hours
Using Eqn. (3). The probability of one bit flip in 6 hours is calculated.
p = 5.448× 10−5
Using Eqn. (2) to create a function for every t input there is a P4095bits output.
Let P4095bits = probability of error in a 4095 bit block
P4095bits = f(k > t)
10
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Let N = number of 4095 bit blocks in TMS570’s 4MB memory
N = 7815
Using Eqn. (2) again for the total probability of error in TMS570’s 4MB memory.
Let Perror = total probability of error in the entire TMS570’s 4MB memory
Perror = f(k > 0)
Figure 6: Probability of error vs number of t bits in TMS570’s 4MB memory.
Figure 6 shows the probability of error in TMS570’s 4MB memory vs number of t bits. For the
probability of error Perror < 10−10, select t = 9 bits. The m = 12 is determined by the minimal
polynomial over the field GF (qm).
R = mt
R = 12× 9bits = 108bits
Therefore, the file system requires R = 108 parity bits for Perror < 10−10. BCH code recovers up to
t = 9 bit errors for every 4095 bit block in the TMS570’s 4MB memory.
The optimal number of parity bits for MRAM’s 4MB memory was calculated below. Furthermore,
the scrubbing period was changed to H = 24hours. The probability of one bit flip for MRAM is
changed to p = 10−10. Other parameters remained the same.
H = 24hours
p = 10−10
Figure 7 shows probability of error in MRAM’s 4MB memory vs number of t bits. For an error
probability of Perror < 10−10, select t = 2 bits.
R = 12× 2bits = 24bits
Therefore, the file system requires R = 24 parity bits for Perror < 10−10. BCH code recovers up to
t = 2 bit errors for every 4095 bit block in MRAM’s 4MB memory.
11
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Figure 7: Probability of error vs number of t bits in MRAM’s 4MB memory.
Implemented Watchdog Design
Figure 8: Layers of watchdogs on the OBC.
The space environment causes many faults in ICs. However, watchdogs mitigate the faults by
restarting ICs. Thus, watchdogs increase the reliability of the OBC. TMS570 has, TPL5010-Q1, a
dedicated external hardware watchdog is shown in Figure 8. At $2 USD (Digikey_TPL5010, 2018),
TPL5010-Q1 is low-cost. TPL5010-Q1 functions within a temperature range of −40◦C to 125◦C
and is vibration resistant. TMS570 periodically sends done signals to TPL5010-Q1. TPL5010-Q1
will force a power reset on the TMS570 if TPL5010-Q1 does not receive a done signal. TPL5010-Q1
ensures the TMS570 recovers from faults. Moreover, TMS570 has a built-in windowed watchdog.
The windowed watchdog monitors FreeRTOS for a done signal and will force a cold reboot on the
12
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TMS570 if it does not receive a done signal. The windowed watchdog adds redundancy to the
watchdog setup. Furthermore, a software watchdog monitors the individual tasks in FreeRTOS.
The software watchdog activates periodically. When the software watchdog activates, the software
watchdog checks the tasks’ time stamps. Each task has a time stamp, which contains the last time
the task fed the software watchdog. If a task’s time stamp is not within the time interval, then the
task will be restarted. Restarting a task clears the previous state and memory of the task. Thus,
the software watchdog increases reliability of each individual task.
Beningo (2010) shows the probabilities of watchdogs successfully recovering from faults. Calcula-
tions below show the probabilities of success for the entire watchdog system. The probabilities of
success for recovering from a fault quantify the reliability of the OBC.
Let P (EWDG) = probability of external hardware watchdog successfully recovering from a
fault
Let P (WWDG) = probability of windowed watchdog successfully recovering from a fault
Let P (SWDG) = probability of software watchdog successfully recovering from a fault
P (EWDG) = 0.85
P (WWDG) = 0.85
P (SWDG) = 0.7
Let P (EWDG ∪WWDG) = probability of external hardware watchdog or windowed watchdog
successfully recovering from a fault
P (EWDG∪WWDG) = P (EWDG) + P (WWDG)− P (WWDG) · P (EWDG)
P (EWDG∪WWDG) = 0.9775
Let P (EWDG ∪WWDG ∪ SWDG) = probability of external hardware watchdog or windowed
watchdog or software watchdog successfully recovering from a fault
P (EWDG∪WWDG∪ SWDG) = P (EWDG∪WWDG) + P (SWDG)
−P (EWDG∪WWDG) · P (SWDG)
P (EWDG∪WWDG∪ SWDG) = 0.9933
Each task in FreeRTOS has a probability of at least P (EWDG∪WWDG∪ SWDG) = 0.9933 for
successfully recovering from a fault. The probability of a failure is very low as there are many layers
of watchdogs. As there many SEUs per hour in LEO, layers of watchdogs ensure the OBC will
survive throughout the mission duration.
Conclusion
CubeSats are a low-cost alternative to full-sized satellites. As all CubeSats have a payload, an
OBC is required to execute the payload. A single OBC has a MCU and some memory. Moreover,
the OBC is built using COTS components as they are readily available and are cheap. However,
COTS components are less tolerant to radiation, temperature, and vibrations when compared to
space grade components. On the other hand, this paper presents hardware and software solutions
to the problems. COTS components such as MR4A16BCMA35, TMS570, and TPL5010-Q1 were
chosen for the OBC. These COTS components have a higher tolerance to radiation, temperature,
and vibrations. Moreover, these components are low-cost as they cost $60, $40, and $2 respectively.
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The MR4A16BCMA35 stores the program data and the sensor data. MR4A16BCMA35’s TID of
4× 104 rad (Si) is larger than the required TID of 2.825× 103 rad (Si). Therefore, MR4A16BCMA35
survives the radiation in LEO. OBC also uses TMS570, a MCU for CubeSat control. TMS570
has dual lockstep CPUs which protect against SEUs. Moreover, TMS570’s TID of 5× 103 rad (Si)
meets the required TID of 2.825× 103 rad (Si). Software solutions were also developed with the
hardware solutions. A file system was designed to protect the data from radiation damage. In
conclusion, these solutions can be used to increase the reliability of spacecraft and could be applied
to radioactive environments.
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